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I. The Suspect Classification Test: An Alternative Analysis Under the
ERA
Pennsylvania is one of sixteen states that have enacted an equal rights
provision. ' Article 1, section 28 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, entitled
"Prohibition against denial or abridgment of equality of rights because of
sex," was adopted May 18, 1971. It simply states, "Equality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.'"2
No committee report, no written record of debate, and no history of
the amendment is recorded. Courts have had and will continue to have
difficulty establishing standards upon which to decide cases because of the
absence of guidelines for judicial construction and the broad, sweeping
language of the amendment.
Pennsylvania courts interpreting the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)
have generally adopted the absolutist point of view, which holds that "the
basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment is that sex is not a
permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women, or of
men. . . . [T]he treatment of any person by the law may not be based
upon the circumstance that such person is of one sex or the other." 3 This
approach allows the court to eliminate distinctions based on sex in a
thorough, simple and clear manner without exceptions and without exer-
cise of judicial discretion. The swift movement toward equality that is
provided by the absolutist model may have great symbolic significance.
Nevertheless, the absolutist approach ignores societal nuances, lacks
flexibility, and is incapable of anticipating problems. Thus it may create
difficulties leading to unnecessary dislocation of the social structure.
* B.A., Brown University; J.D., Temple University School of Law; Vice-Dean,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. The states that have adopted equal rights amendments are Alaska, Colorado,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
The earliest state constitutional provisions for equal rights for both men and women are
found in Utah (1896) and Wyoming (1890). Massachusetts approved the most recent such
provision on November 2, 1976.
2. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
3. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitu-
tional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 889 (1971).
Pennsylvania courts in interpreting the Equal Rights Amendment
have not considered alternative analyses. Generally, the cases before the
courts have not lent themselves to alternative rationales. 4 In appropriate
cases, however, it may be possible as well as desirable for the courts to
broaden their view. The ERA itself does not mandate exclusive use of the
absolutist position. As Professor Paul A. Freund has observed, "A
mandate that equal rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
• . .on account of sex can have either of two conceivable meanings. It can
mean any classification based on sex must be justified by some good (or
very good or compelling) reason, or it can mean that no such classification
can pass muster."
5
To expand their perspective, the courts should examine gender-based
classification under the strict scrutiny equal protection test developed
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In
dealing with cases of discrimination based on a suspect classification, such
as race, the Supreme Court has required defendants to prove a compelling
reason to justify preferential treatment. 6 Sex, like race, can be considered a
suspect classification. 7
The foundation for characterizing sex as a suspect classification is the
breadth of the language of the Equal Rights Amendment itself. "Equality
of right under the law" 8 is similar to the "equal protection of the laws"
language of the fourteenth amendment.9 The equal protection clause of the
federal amendment has been the wellspring of the suspect classification test
and of the elimination of bias based on race, national origin, and alien-
age.1° The Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment can be viewed as
incorporating and expanding the concepts of the equal protection clause so
as to bar gender-based bias. The precedential value of the language of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment combined with the
"equality of rights under the law" mandate of the Pennsylvania Equal
Rights Amendment gives the courts substantial basis for classifying sex as
suspect. 11
4. One notable exception is Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Association, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975), discussed at note 114 and
accompanying text infra.
5. Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
234, 237 (1971).
6. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966). "At the very least, the Equal Protection
Clause demands that racial classifications. . . be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny'. . . if
they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of
some permissible state objective. ... Id. at 11. See also Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1087-132 (1969); Comment, Are Sex-Based Classifica-
tions Constitutionally Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 481 (1971).
7. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); see note 11 infra.
8. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
10. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1(1966); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
11. While it is true that the United States Supreme Court has not yet placed sex in the
suspect category along with race, national origin, and alienage, the Court has indicated that it
shall reconsider the question after decision by the state legislatures on the federal ERA. Four
Justices concluded, however, that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications based
upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be
If the Pennsylvania courts adopt the suspect classification test,
groupings based on gender will be subjected to the same precise, micro-
scopic scrutiny as those based on race. 12 This approach is to be distin-
guished from the less stringent "rational relation" test, which "defers to
legislative judgment and upholds a distinction so long as the distinction can
be reasonably construed as consistent with any legitimate governmental
goal." 13
Although there are benefits in injecting the suspect classification
analysis into the ERA framework, there are also dangers. The possibility of
judicial and legislative abuse accompanied by excessive litigation is raised.
The tempo of reaching the goal of total equal rights under law for women
may be slowed. Despite these disadvantages, the suspect classification test
is an essential alternative to the absolutist approach. Certain circumstances
lend themselves to the suspect classification analysis. For example, an
alimony statute that provides special protection for women who stay at
home taking care of their household during marriage or a statute that
qualifies women for unemployment benefits even if they voluntarily
discontinue their employment in order to follow their spouse to a new
location may have compelling validity that would not survive the absolutist
test.
The use of the suspect classification analysis admittedly does not
provide as sure-fire protection against discriminatory decisions as does the
absolutist analysis, but it does have an advantage. Society can gradually
adjust to the socio-economic realities because the test is flexible enough to
permit gender-based classifications that have compelling social value.
In making the ERA operational, the judiciary must not dispossess the
transitional woman-the woman whose ingrained social expectations were
to marry, to be supported by her husband, and to tend the house and
children-the woman who expected any income she earned outside the
home to be only supplemental. Women who have expectations of self-
sufficiency and complete equality are not transitional women. Part of this
non-transitional group consists of that small percentage of women who
marry with the understanding that the man and the woman will both work,
will both contribute financially and physically to the household, and will
both burden their careers by the demands of marriage on an equal basis.
Although the traditional family model of husband-breadwinner and
wife-homemaker is valid today for no more than 34 percent of husband-
subjected to close judicial scrutiny." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
Three Justices concurring in the result of the case refused to designate sex as a suspect
classification, asserting that a "general categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the
strictest test of judicial scrutiny" should be deferred until decision on the federal ERA. Id. at
692.
12. The Supreme Court of Illinois adopted this analysis in People v. Ellis, 57 111. 2d 127,
311 N.E.2d 98 (1974).
13. Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1503 (1971).
wife families,' 4 most married working women see themselves as transi-
tional women. Consider the defeat of the state equal rights amendments in
New York and New Jersey in November 1975.15 As one commentator
wrote, "The sex [equality] issue became a class issue. That broad coalition
[that formerly supported the equal rights amendment] was transmuted, in
the public eye, into an elitist minority fringe that didn't give a damn about
the homemakers or women at the bottom of the labor market . '.'.. 16
Many of these transitional women, at least in New York and New Jersey,
are antagonistic to the "elitist minority fringe" and the equal rights
amendment.
The task of implementing the ERA has fallen to the judiciary in
Pennsylvania. 17 It is unfortunate that the legislature has not viewed the
passage of the ERA as a moral mandate to review carefully and systemat-
ically all statutes relating to gender bias in order to eradicate sex discrimi-
nation. The legislature should overhaul and supplement existing laws so
that the Commonwealth may develop a coherent, comprehensive and
unbiased legislative plan. Such legislative action would also provide
guidelines for the judiciary. 18
In the absence of comprehensive legislative action, judicial efforts to
implement the ERA have produced a patchwork result. The Pennsylvania
courts have applied the Equal Rights Amendment in several areas of the
law: alimony pendente lite, child support, consortium, criminal law,
divorce a mensa et thoro, interscholastic athletics, interspousal support,
and marital property rights. The remainder of this article analyzes some of
these decisions and suggests alternative resolutions.
14. Hayghe, Families and the Rise of Working Wives-An Overview, 99 MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 18 (1976).
15. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
16. Lear, You 'll Probably Think I'm Stupid, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, April 11, 1976, at
112.
17. The ERA has triggered minimal legislative action. An example of legislative action
is the amendment to the alimony pendente lite statute making the statute applicable to both
sexes. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN' tit. 23, § 46 (Purdon Supp. 1976) (amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 46 (Purdon 1955)).
18. Guidance for Pennsylvania legislative revision and judicial decision is to be found in
A Memorandum on the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution
published by the Citizens Advisory Council on the Status of Women in 1970. (The Council was
established by Executive Order No. 11,126, 3 C.F.R. 791 (Supp. 1963)). The five-point guide,
containing proposals for statutory interpretation in the event that the federal ERA is adopted,
suggests appropriate remedial action for sex-biased statutes:
1. Laws that confer a benefit, privilege, or obligation of citizenship on one
sex: Strike the sex identification words and apply the law to both sexes.
2. Laws that restrict or deny opportunities of women or men: Strike such
laws as unconstitutional.
3. Laws that make age distinction on the basis of sex: Equalize such laws up
or down.
4. Laws that involve differences based on sexual or reproductive capacity:
Leave unchanged.
5. Laws that mandate separation of sexes: Strike such laws as
unconstitutional.
An example of a law in the fourth category is one providing maternity benefits. The
memorandum suggests that laws in the fifth category be allowed to stand if the separation is
shown to be justified by an overriding and compelling public interest, but does not establish
the rationale for such exceptions to the fifth category.
II. Support of Spouse and Children Under the ERA
Prior to this decade the duty of support in Pennsylvania was well
defined. The law, based on sharply etched societal roles, required the
husband to support his wife 19 and children during marriage.20 Absent proof
of indigency on the part of the male, the right of the children to be
supported by their father was absolute. 21 The wife's right to support,
however, could be defeated if she engaged in conduct amounting to
grounds for divorce 22 or voluntarily left her husband without legal
reason.
23
The husband and father was recognized as head of the household
24
and, so long as he was living in the household, his wife could not maintain
an action for support against him except under the most unusual circum-
stances. 25 Nevertheless, the duty of the husband to provide for his family
was so strong that a separate but parallel duty existed: the husband was
legally obligated to pay for necessaries.26
After termination of the marriage, the husband had a continuing duty
to support his children until their emancipation, and sometimes beyond.
27
If he neglected to provide support, certain sanctions were available against
him, including incarceration.
28
The derivation of the Commonwealth's support laws can be traced to
English law. Although at common law, a father had no duty to support his
children, the obligation sprang from the poor laws.29 The duty to support
his wife, however, was deeply ingrained in the common-law system.30 The
Pennsylvania law of support based on this strong legal tradition also
recognized certain cultural expectations: that the woman would tend house
and raise the children while the man earned money outside the home. This
view of society is reflected in judicial decisions as well as in criminal and
civil support statutes.
19. Commonwealth ex rel. Krouse v. Krouse, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 13, 289 A.2d 233
(1972).
20. Commonwealth ex rel. Brotz v. Norris, 184 Pa. Super. Ct. 594, 135 A.2d 771 (1957).
21. Hecht v. Hecht, 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 150 A.2d 139 (1959); Commonwealth v.
Cleary, 95 Pa. Super. Ct. 592 (1929).
22. Keeth v. Keeth, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 96, 289 A.2d 732 (1972).
23. Commonwealth ex rel. Pinkenson v. Pinkenson, 162 Pa. Super. Ct. 227,57 A.2d 720
(1948); Commonwealth v. Bachman, 108 Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 164 A. 833 (1933).
24. See Commonwealth ex rel. Glenn v. Glenn, 208 Pa. Super. Ct. 206, 222 A.2d 465
(1966).
25. Commonwealth v. George, 358 Pa. 118, 56 A.2d 228 (1948); Scuro v. Scuro, 226 Pa.
Super. Ct. 592,323 A.2d 49(1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Gauby v. Gauby, 223 Pa. Super. Ct.
92, 289 A.2d 745 (1972).
26. Adler v. Adler, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 508,90 A.2d 389 (1952); Turner v. Tur ier, 169 Pa.
Super. Ct. 120, 82 A.2d 320 (1951). In the post-Equal Rights Amendment era, the wife is
obligated for necessaries of her husband. See Albert Einstein Med. Center v. Gold, 66 Pa. D.
& C.2d 347 (C.P. Phila. 1974).
27. Commonwealth ex rel. Groff v. Groff, 173 Pa. Super. Ct. 535,98 A.2d 449 (1953).
28. See Barrett v. Barrett, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 590, 352 A.2d 74 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 62, § 2043.36 (Purdon 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1151 (Purdon 1964); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4321 (Purdon 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4322 (Purdon 1973).
29. H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMESTIC RELATIONS § 6.2 at 187 (1968).
30. Id. at 181.
The judicial decisions have followed a consistent pattern of reinforc-
ing the societal norm in the face of a complex and confusing statutory
scheme that recklessly mixes substance with procedure and civil with
criminal law.
The seven major support laws are found in five different volumes of
the codified laws of Pennsylvania (see Table I). Litigants and the courts are
frequently uncertain as to the appropriate provision under which to
proceed. 3t The courts have attempted to interpret and thereby to rescue the
statutory schemes without notable success. The Equal Rights Amendment
was injected into this disorderly picture in 1971.32
Table I
MAJOR SUPPORT LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA
Pa. Stat. Ann. Category








tit. 19, § 1151 Criminal Procedure
Sentence and
Punishment








tit. 62, § 2043.31 Civil
et seq. Civil Procedural
Support Law
tit. 62, § 1971 Civil
et seq. Support Law
A. Child Support
It is ironic that although the
Function
Substantive right of wife and children
to support against male
35
Misdemeanor charge against male for
nonsupport
Criminal contempt charge against
male for nonsupport
37
Enforcement of substantive rights to
support against male
38
Proceedings against male's property
for failure to support
Enforcement of substantive rights to
support against male
39
Substantive right of indigent spouse
to support
support statutes are in dire need of
clarification, the most significant case to be decided by the Pennsylvania
31. Commonwealth v. Feingold, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 360 A.2d 692 (1976).
32. See Comment, The Support Law and the Equal Rights Amendment in Pennsyl-
vania, 77 DICK. L. REV. 254 (1972).
33. This provision is cited as providing the basic substantive support law. Common-
wealth ex rel. Krouse v. Krouse, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 13, 289 A.2d 233 (1972).
34. This provision is characterized as quasi-criminal. Commissioner v. Rankin, 270
F.2d 160 (3rd Cir. 1959); Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 182 Pa. Super. Ct. 584,
128 A.2d 164 (1956); Commonwealth v. Olson, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 363 (C.P. Warren 1974).
35. Commonwealth ex rel. Krouse v. Krouse, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 13, 289 A.2d 233
(1972).
36. Commonwealth v. Olson, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 363 (C.P. Warren 1974).
37. Commonwealth v. Peters, 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 82, 113 A.2d 327 (1955).
38. Commonwealth ex rel. Krouse v. Krouse, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 13, 289 A.2d 233
(1972).
39. Commonwealth ex rel. Krouse v. Krouse, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 13, 289 A.2d 233
(1972); Commonwealth v. Olson, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 363 (C.P. Warren 1974).
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Supreme Court under the Equal Rights Amendment, Conway v. Dana ,40
did not turn on statutory law, but on an interpretation of prior decisional
law. The settled law had been that "the income and financial resources of
the mother are to be treated only as attending circumstances., 41 The
Conway court, using the Equal Rights Amendment as its rationale, stated,
"Support, as every other duty encompassed in the role of parenthood, is
the equal responsibility of mother and father." 41a The court held that
"insofar as [prior] decisions suggest a presumption that the father, solely
because of his sex and without regard to the actual circumstances of the
parties, must accept the principal burden of financial support of minor
children, they may no longer be followed."
42
While the court may have meted out justice to the parties before it, the
overly broad language of its decision may have serious and adverse effects
on women and families in the future. In dismissing the established
presumption, the court created a serious void. Implicit in the presumption
was the societal fact that the woman, the usual custodial parent, contrib-
uted to the financial health of the household in caring for the home, the
husband and the children. Therefore, the husband was primarily respon-
sible for financial support. Because the court voided the presumption, it
must now explicitly state what it has heretofore implied: the spouse who
undertakes the custodial or homemaker role is performing sevices readily
translatable into monetary value.
Although the model is inexact, marriage can be considered a partner-
ship in many respects 43 In partnership parlance, the custodial parent can be
viewed as the inside person and the wage earner as the outside one. The
right of each "partner" to a share of the income of the "partnership"
should be proportionate-the spouse performing the custodial or domestic
chores is entitled to economic credit in determining a fair and appropriate
distribution of the income of the marital unit. Other important factors in the
distribution of income are the "partnership" resources and prosperity; the
number, age and needs of the children; the living standard of the family;
the length of time the "partnership" has been in existence; the present
40. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974). See also Kushik v. Kushik, 458 Pa. 475, 328 A.2d
505 (1974).
41. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536,539, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974), citing Commonwealth
ex rel. Yeats v. Yeats, 168 Pa. Super. Ct. 550, 79 A.2d 793 (1951); Commonwealth ex rel.
Firestone v. Firestone, 158 Pa. Super. Ct. 579, 45 A.2d 923 (1946); Commonwealth ex rel.
Barnes v. Barnes, 151 Pa. Super. Ct. 202, 30 A.2d 437 (1943).
41a. 456 Pa. at 540, 318 A.2d at 326.
42. 456 Pa. at 539, 318 A.2d at 326. In Conway a father appealed a denial of his petition
to reduce his support obligation. Since the imposition of the original support order, his
take-home pay had markedly decreased and his wife had secured employment. The supreme
court remanded with instructions that his decreased income and his wife's income from her
new job be considered in modifying the support obligation.
43. For a discussion of the concept of marriage as a partnership between co-equals see
Foster & Freed, Marital Property Reform in New York: Partnership of Co-Equals ?, 8 FAM.
L.Q. 169 (1974); 48 TEMP. L.Q. 397 (1975). In DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d
174 (1975), the court refers to the concept of marriage as a partnership in a discussion of
marital property.
assets and future potential; the nature and difficulty of the work performed
and the responsibility assumed by each "partner"; the age, physical
condition, emotional health and special needs of each "partner"; and the
availability to each "partner" of resources other than "partnership"
resources." All of these elements are vital in distributing "partnership"
income, but only one will be explored in depth: the value of the custodial
parent's services.
Courts in jurisdictions outside of Pennsylvania have recognized the
economic as well as the social importance of the custodial parent's
services.45 In matters of support Pennsylvania courts have noted the social
importance of the homemaker while remaining silent on the issue of the
monetary value attributable to that role.
[T]here are strong moral reasons and public policy considera-
tions why the law should not by implication force a wife to seek
employment when there are minor children at home. A mother
has a moral, if not legal right to choose to remain home with
minor children and provide a home with a constant presence of a
parental figure. The courts may not interfere with this wish of a
mother to give her children love and guidance.
46
While recognition of the social value of the at-home parent is
praiseworthy, the courts must now turn their attention to the economic
worth of such service. The legislature should recognize the partnership
model and establish equitable standards in the support statutes to serve as a
guide for the courts.47 The courts have taken a mechanistic and simplistic
approach to the amount of support to be awarded. Commonwealth ex rel.
Buonocore v. Buonocore48 typifies the method of calculating child support
in the Conway v. Dana era. A father retaining custody of the children
sought a support order against their mother. The court mechanically
calculated the mother's and father's incomes and arrived at the mother's
44. Cf. Kaper v. Kaper, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 377, 323 A.2d 222 (1974) (income and assets
of both parents considered before final support order is entered).
45. See Halle v. Halle, 25 Md. App. 350, 333 A.2d 360 (1975). The Maryland court held
that the well-being of two young children was enhanced by being cared for by their mother.
The court adopted the position that the budget for child support must include an item for child
care even if performed by the mother. It was necessary to provide within the child support
funds for clothing, food and lodging for the mother.
46. White v. White, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 499, 504 n.4, 313 A.2d 776, 780 n.4 (1973).
47. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act contains the following standards:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, maintenance, or child
support, the court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to a
child to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his support, without regard to
marital misconduct, after considering all relevant factors including:
1. the financial resources of the child;
2. the financial resources of the custodial parent;
3. the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not
been dissolved;
4. the physical and emotional condition of the child and his educational
needs; and
5. the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9 UNIF. LAWS ANN. § 309, at 298 (Supp. 1976).
This section of the uniform act has been adopted in several states. See ARIz. REV. STAT. §
25-320 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.210 (1973);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-323 (Supp. 1975).
48. 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 66, 340 A.2d 579 (1975).
minimum contribution.4 9 The court should have translated the father's
custodial care into an additional monetary contribution by him.
In addition, the Conway decision raises but does not fully explore the
question of the support obligation of the parent who may not be in a
position to make monetary contributions. The court stated that both parents
''must be required to discharge the [support] obligation in accordance with
their capacity and ability." 50 Does this mean that the custodial parent who
may have earned a law degree but has chosen to remain at home is obligated
to secure a position in accordance with his or her "capacity and ability"?
The court appears to have said "no" when it noted that "when we consider
the [support] order to be assessed against the father, we must not only
consider his property, income and earning capacity but also what, if any,
contribution the mother is in a position to make."
5'
If the court meant to imply that the custodial parent may not be in a
position to make a monetary contribution, then a forthright statement to
this effect is needed, especially in light of another statement: "Support, as
every other duty encompassed in the role of parenthood, is the equal
responsibility of both mother and father.' '52 It is likely that future decisions
may interpret the language of Conway v. Dana too broadly 53 and arrive at
the unfortunate position of imposing two jobs on the custodial parent and
only one on the non-custodial parent; that is, the custodial parent may be
forced to be a breadwinner as well as a homemaker while the non-custodial
parent will be expected to be only a wage earner.
54
B. Interspousal Support
Child support is not the only area of Pennsylvania law to be
scrutinized under the ERA. In 1973, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
reviewed the problem of interspousal support in Commonwealth ex rel.
Lukens v. Lukens. 5 The Pennsylvania law of interspousal support man-
49. Accord, Centracchio v. Meinhold, 1 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2066 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
50. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 540, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974).
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. See Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interschol. Athl. Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct.
45, 50, 334 A.2d 839, 841 (1975) (quotes Conway v. Dana as standing for the proposition that
"support is the equal responsibility of both parents and that, in light of the ERA, the courts
must now consider the property, income and earning capacity of both in order to determine
their respective obligations."); Commonwealth ex rel. Travitzky v. Travitzky, 230 Pa. Super.
Ct. 435,438,326 A.2d 883,884 (1974) ("[T]he duty to support minor children now equally rests
on both parents where they are financially able to bear the burden.").
In a more recent case, Commonwealth ex rel. Kaplan v. Kaplan, 236tPa. Super. Ct. 26,344
A.2d 578 (1975), the court clearly stated that the test for females is identical to that for males:
"The test is not what her actual earnings are, but what her earning capacity is." Id. at-, 344
A.2d at 580. The superior court appeared unmoved by testimony that the mother would have
to work at a greater distance from home in order to realize her full "earning capacity."
54. Judge Spaeth addressed himself to the homemaker reentering the labor market:
Suppose for example that the wife graduated from law school but practiced only a
year, after which she had and raised children. If her husband is permitted to inquire
into her earning capacity (the children being grown and no longer living with the
wife), he should be required to prove not the earning capacity of 'lawyers,' but
specially the chances of someone like his wife getting employment as a lawyer, and
if she did, what her earnings would be.
White v. White, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 499, 318 A.2d 776 (1973).
55. 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 227, 303 A.2d 522,(1973).
dated that, with certain exceptions, the husband owed a duty of support to
his wife.
56
Lukens appealed an order directing him to pay his wife $35 per week
support, contending that the Nonsupport Law 57 violated the Equal Rights
Amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The relevant portion of the statute
read:
If any husband, or father,. .. separates himself from his wife or
from his children . ..without reasonable cause or wilfully
neglects to maintain [them] . . . [t]he court . . . may order the
person [male] to pay such sum as said court shall think reason-
able and proper for the comfortable maintenance of the said wife
and children or both, and to commit such person to prison
58
The statute sets up alternative criteria under which the female could
petition for support: first, if her husband separates himself without reason-
able cause or, second, if the husband wilfully neglects to maintain her. The
statute entitles the wife to support on the basis of her status, not her need.
Need is a factor only as to the amount of support.
The majority on the court in Lukens concluded that the Nonsupport
Law did not violate the Equal Rights Amendment even though it provided
the female with a right not applicable to the male and provided a sanction
against the male not available against the female. The superior court
refused to test the statute on its own merits, but reviewed the statutory
scheme of interspousal support in Pennsylvania. The court found the
scheme to be constitutional because "they [the support laws] do not deny
rights based on the impermissible classification of the sex of the individu-
al."- 59 The perceived equality rested on the assertion that the Support
Law,60 which permited an indigent husband to seek support from his wife,
was the direct counterpart of the Nonsupport Law.
61
The Lukens court saw reciprocity where none existed.62 With few
exceptions the deserted wife is presumptively entitled to support. 63 On the
other hand, the status of her husband as husband does not entitle him to
support; he must establish indigency and consequent need.' The court did
56. See Krouse v. Krouse, 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 13, 289 A.2d 233 (1972).
57. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 733, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4733 (now PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4322 (Purdon 1973)).
58. Id.
59. 224 Pa. Super. Ct. at 229, 303 A.2d at 523.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (Purdon 1968).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4322 (Purdon 1973).
62. The court cited the dissent in Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 182, 303
A.2d 843 (1973), for support of its proposition. The Henderson dissent, quoting the common
pleas court in Commonwealth ex rel. Lukens v. Lukens, 60 Del. 170, 173-74 (Pa. C.P. 1972),
stated,
The vast majority of support cases concern themselves with a petition filed by a
wife. However, the Act of 1937 is sufficiently broad to allow a husband to seek
support. Thus, the law does not arbitrarily deprive a husband from support as the
respondent contends.
Id. at 189, 303 A.2d at 847.
63. Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 166 Pa. Super. Ct. 6, 70 A.2d 481 (1950).
64. Commonwealth ex rel. Home for the Jewish Aged v. Kotzker, 179 Pa. Super. Ct.
not confront the opposing and inequitable presumptions under the two
statutes in question. It is therefore difficult to give credence to the rationale
of equality in reciprocity. The statutory scheme is patently discriminatory
and unconstitutional.65
Nevertheless, relying on Lukens, the court in Norris v. Norris
66
upheld the constitutionality of a statute permitting a wife, but not her
husband, to bring an in rem action for maintenance. 67 The reciprocity
argument is more difficult to justify in Norris than in Lukens. The statute
in question afforded the wife a highly specific remedy; no comparable
remedy was given the husband. The statute should have been declared
unconstitutional, or, as an alternative, the benefit of the statute should have
been extended to the male by judicial construction.
68
Norris and Lukens addressed the duty of support and its enforcement
but did not discuss the amount of support in any detail. Is a wife's estate,
her earnings, and her earning capacity to be considered in determining the
amount of support? In White v. White69 a husband appealed an order
requiring him to pay his wife $600 per month plus all reasonable medical
and dental expenses. Appellant argued that wife's earning power should
have been considered in fixing the amount of the award. The superior court
voiced the opinion that, on the basis of precedent and not on the basis of the
Equal Rights Amendment, a wife's separate earnings is a relevant cir-
cumstance for the court to consider. The court also expanded precedent:
In the interest of fairness and with consistency in mind, we see
no reason why, in this day and age, a court must limit its inquiry
to the wife's earnings. Under the appropriate circumstances, a
wife's 'earning capacity' may be a material factor in arriving at a
reasonable support order. . . . While she [the wife] may have
521, 118 A.2d 271 (1955). "By 'indigent' persons is meant those who have not sufficient means
to pay for their care and maintenance themselves." Id. at 525, 118 A.2d at 273. Accord,
Commonwealth ex rel. Buonocore v. Buonocore, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 66, 68,340A.2d579,581
(1975).
65. The need to reassess the Lukens holding was recognized in dictum in Common-
wealth v. Feingold, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 360 A.2d 692, 695 (1976).
66. 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 239 (C.P. Phila. 1974).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 132 (Purdon 1965).
Whenever any man has heretofore separated, or hereafter shall separate, himself
from his wife or children, without reasonable cause, or whose whereabouts are
unknown, and, being of sufficient ability, has neglected or refused or shall neglect
or refuse to provide suitable maintenance for his said wife or children, proceedings
may be had against any property real or personal of said husband necessary for the
suitable maintenance of the said wife or children ....
Id.
68. In cases challenging statutes under the Equal Rights Amendment the courts
will be faced with essentially two alternatives: either to invalidate the statute or to
equalize its application to the two sexes ....
In determining the impact of a constitutional provision upon a nonconforming
statute, courts look primarily to the legislative intent behind the statute in question.
Whether the statute falls completely or is modified in some way depends upon the
court's assessment of what the legislature itself would have done had it known that
all or part of its original enactment would be invalid.
Brown, Emerson, Falk, Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 913 (1971). For a discussion of the extension
principle, see id. at 912-20.
69. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 499, 313 A.2d 776 (1973). The holding in this case is based on an
equal protection argument rather than the Equal Rights Amendment. A discussion of it is
essential to a complete understanding of the courts' position on interspousal support.
such a right of support from a husband who abandons her
without reasonable cause, that is not to say that she may sit back
• . . and expect full support. . .. Where the children are of
adult age and are no longer residing with the wife, or where no
children are born of the marriage, an order of support which
makes a husband fully responsible for the support of an employ-
able wife is confiscatory. Where a wife's dependency on her
husband is voluntary, and not prompted by some justifiable
reason such as poor health, a court should take her employability
into consideration when fixing the order of support. Under these
limited circumstances, . . . a court may look to the earning
capacity of a wife in determining the amount a husband must pay
to support his wife.
70
The essential problem raised by White is the definition of employabil-
ity. It is important that the broad language quoted above be read in
conjunction with its footnote:
In determining whether a wife is employable, the court
should take into consideration the amount of time that a wife
during her marriage has been out of work. If a wife has been a
housewife during all or most of a marriage,. .. that is a relevant
factor. Certainly, a woman who has been off of the 'job market'
for a considerable period of time may have a more difficult time
in obtaining employment. . . . Employability, after all, means
more than just the availability of work, the relative skills of the
worker, the health and stamina of the worker, and the absence of
children in the home for which the wife would have responsibil-
ity. A court should consider all of the above factors and measure
those elements with the duration of unemployment experienced
by the wife. These same considerations apply regardless of who
is seeking support, whether it be the husband, the wife or some
other dependent.
7'
In addition to these considerations the court should have incorporated
the standard, established by the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 72 that
the employment must be appropriate. It would be desirable for the court to
state this standard squarely. Certainly a spouse in good health who held the
job as homemaker for thirty years may not have marketable skills conso-
nant with his or her status during marriage. Such a person should not be
forced into the labor market to cook, clean homes or provide child care
because he or she is "employable" despite the absence of appropriate
employment.
The courts have found a vague and artificial parity in the Pennsylvania
support statutes and have concluded that the obligation of support, al-
though not identical, is roughly equal for both sexes 3 A fresh review by
the legislature of the support statutes is needed; such a review should
70. Id. at 504-06, 313 A.2d at 780.
71. Id. at 505 n.5, 313 A.2d at 780 n.5.
72. One of the elements in determining maintenance for the spouse seeking it is that he
or she "is unable to support himself through appropriate employment." Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act, 9 UNIF. LAWS ANN. § 308, at 295 (Supp. 1976).
73. Lukens v. Lukens, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 227, 303 A.2d 522(1973). Norris v. Norris, 63
Pa. D. & C.2d 239 (C.P. Phila. 1974).
clarify the substantive, procedural, criminal and civil support law. As
stated in a recent law review article,
[t]he entire range of Pennsylvania's support law is hopelessly
confused in an unnecessary plethora of statutes, most wrestling
with substantially the same objective. . . .[T]he solution be-
comes obvious: restructure the law to meet the requirements of
the equal rights amendment, and while so doing, revise and
consolidate the whole body of support law into a comprehensible
unit .
74
In so doing, the legislature should take realistic cognizance of the transi-
tional woman, the desirability of a custodial parent remaining at home with
young children, and the entitlement of a spouse to support consonant with
the economic health of the marital partnership.
The need for legislative action is not confined to the support statutes,
but is apparent in the areas of alimony, divorce and marital property
arrangements as well.
III. Alimony Pendente Lite and Divorce from Bed and Board
Another provision of the law that has come under attack since the
passage of the Equal Rights Amendment is the statutory allowance for
alimony pendente lite, counsel fees and expenses. 75 The award was
available exclusively to a wife for support, counsel fees and expenses
during the pendency of a suit for divorce or annulment. "The rule is
founded upon elementary principles of justice. The denial of support to an
injured wife during the pendency of her suit against her husband, or of
counsel fees and expenses occasioned thereby, would, by the closing of his
purse, surrender to his control her right to secure redress." 76 A-companion
statute, divorce a mensa et thoro, 77 commonly known as divorce from bed
and board or legal separation, was also subjected to an equal rights
challenge on the basis that it provided a remedy only for the wife. "After a
divorce a mensa et thoro the marriage relationship continues unimpaired,
74. Comment, The Support Law and the Equal Rights Amendment In Pennsylvania, 77
DICK. L. REV. 254, 275-76 (1973).
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Purdon 1955). "In case of divorce from the bonds of
matrimony or bed and board, the court may, upon petition, in proper cases, allow a wife
reasonable alimony pendente lite and reasonable counsel fees and expenses." Id. This statute
was amended June 27, 1974 to conform to the requirements of the equal rights amendment. In
amended form: "In case of divorce from the bonds of matrimony or bed and board, the court
may, upon petition, in proper cases, allow a spouse reasonable alimony pendente lite and
reasonable counsel fees and expenses .... PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Purdon Supp.
1976).
76. A. FREEDMAN & M. FREEDMAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
§ 429, at 890 (2d ed. 1957).
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § II (Purdon 1955).
Upon complaint, and due proof thereof, it shall be lawful for a wife to obtain a
divorce from bed and board whenever it shall be judged, in the manner hereinafter
provided in cases of divorce, that her husband has:
a) Maliciously abandoned his family; or
b) Maliciously turned her out of doors; or
c) By cruel and barbarous treatment endangered her life; or




although cohabitation is thereby suspended." 78 The wife's entitlement to
support continues.
A series of cases challenged one or both of these statutory provi-
sions. 79 Henderson v. Henderson8" challenged the unilateral obligation of
the husband under the alimony pendente lite statute. The superior court
repelled the attack on the statute, but the court was equally divided. The
dissent made headlines by stating that the purpose of "the Equality of
Rights Amendment mandates a further extension of this policy of equality
by repudiating the sex of the individual as a permissible criteria [sic] for
determining legal rights in Pennsylvania.''81 The trumpet was sounded.
The Equal Rights Amendment would concentrate on the abridgement of
male rights.
Six months later, in Wiegand v. Wiegand,82 the superior court faced
the issue of alimony pendente lite anew, and, in addition, the issue of
divorce from bed and board. The equal rights challenge was raised sua
sponte83 and the provisions for alimony pendente lite84 and divorce from
bed and board85 were declared unconstitutional. Wiegand reiterated the
dissent in Henderson86 and emphasized that "[t]he basic principle of the
Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment is that sex is not a permissible
factor in determining the legal rights of women, or of men. This means that
the treatment of any person by the law may not be based upon the
circumstances that the person is of one sex or the other." 87 Shortly after
this decision the legislature amended the alimony pendente lite statute,
88
extending the rights thereunder to both sexes, but took no action to
restructure divorce from bed and board.
78. A. FREEDMAN & M. FREEDMAN, supra note 76, § 383 at 805.
79. Divorce a mensa et thoro: Corso v. Corso, 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 546 (C.P. Allegh. 1972).
Divorce a mensa et thoro and alimony pendente lite: Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super.
Ct. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973), rev'd, 461 Pa. 482,337 A.2d 256 (1975); Frank v. Frank, 62 Pa. D.
& C.2d 102 (C.P. Leb. 1973).
Alimony pendente lite: Henderson v. Henderson, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 182, 303 A.2d 843
(1973), rev'd, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974); Cooper v. Cooper, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 344, 307
A.2d 310 (1973); Murphy v. Murphy, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 460, 303 A.2d 838 (1973); De Rosa v.
De Rosa, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 71 (C.A. Del. 1972); Kehl v. Kehl, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 164 (C.P.
Allegh. 1972).
80. 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 182, 303 A.2d 843 (1973), rev'd, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974).
81. Id. at 186, 303 A.2d at 846. The dissenting opinion was the foundation for the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's majority decision in Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60
(1974), which held the statute providing for alimony pendente lite unconstitutional as violative
of the ERA. The supreme court decision, rendered October 16, 1974, had little practical effect
in light of the fact that the legislature had amended the statute on June 24, 1974, extending the
right to both males and females. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Purdon Supp. 1976).
82. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 278, 310 A.2d 426 (1973).
83. Appellant had not raised constitutional issues.
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 46 (Purdon 1955).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (Purdon 1955).
86. The Wiegand opinion was written by Judge Spaulding, who had written the
Henderson dissent.
87. 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 278, 286, 310 A.2d 426, 430 (1973). The language is quoted from
Corso v. Corso, 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 546 (C.P. Allegh. 1972), which extensively paraphrases the
commentary in support of the federal equal rights amendment. See Brown, Emerson, Falk &
Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for
Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
88. See note 81 supra.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently reversed the superior
court on the technical ground that the equal rights question was not
properly before the court, the court having raised the issue on its own.
89
Although divorce from bed and board is again constitutional under the
supreme court decision, it is in reality an ineffective remedy. The Pennsyl-
vania Superior Court has clearly stated that the Act is unconstitutional. It is
expected that the superior court will again find the Act unconstitutional
when an appropriate case is presented.
The result of the Wiegand litigation is that the transitional woman,
90
especially the middle-aged or older homemaker, is vulnerable. In Pennsyl-
vania her remedy of divorce from bed and board is ineffective; there is no
statutory provision entitling her to alimony after a final divorce decree, and
no statute entitles her to equitable property division after the dissolution of
the marriage. 9' Unless such a woman had the ability, foresight and wisdom
to save her money, she is in an unfortunate position, deprived of the fruits
of her labor performed during marriage. Legislative action is essential.
The need for legislative action is particularly acute in light of judicial
rejection of the alternative of extending the right to divorce from bed and
board to both sexes:
We therefore cannot judicially interpret the word 'wife' as
meaning spouse, even to save the Act from falling as unconstitu-
tional. To redraft. . . would be to undertake a wholly inappro-
priate judicial activity amounting to judicial legislation. 92
Extension has been suggested by the Citizens Advisory Council on the
Status of Women as appropriate remedial action for sex biased statutes. 93 It
has also been advocated by scholars:
Where a statute denies equal protection by making an
unconstitutional classification, the classification can be
abolished by making the statute operate either on everyone or on
no one. . . . Though the test is imprecise, a court must weigh
the general interest in retaining the statute against the court's
own reluctance to extend legislation to those not previously
covered. Such an inquiry may lead a court into examination of
legislative purpose, the overall statutory scheme, statutory ar-
rangements in connected fields, and the need of the public.'
The courts of Pennsylvania have effected extension by excising
portions of statutes, 95 although they have been unwilling to alter or amend
89. On May 13, 1975, in Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482,485,337 A.2d 256,258(1975),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the superior court and remanded Wiegand to the
superior court "for consideration of the issues raised at trial and properly preserved for
appellate review."
90. See notes 13-18 and accompanying text supra.
91. See notes 77-89 supra, 101-103 infra, and accompanying text.
92. Wiegand v. Wiegand, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 278, 284-85, 310 A.2d 426, 429 (1973).
93. See note 18 supra.
94. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1136-37
(1969). See also Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 68, at 912-20.
95. E.g., Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974). A portion of the
Muncy Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 566 (Purdon Supp. 1976), which prohibited trial courts
from fixing minimum sentence for females, was declared unconstitutional as violative of the
Pennsylvania ERA and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The effect
words within a statute. As to sex classification, the result of excision,
alteration or addition is the same. The statute surgically altered is made to
affect both sexes equally. A sensible, consistent position for the courts,
whenever appropriate, is to save the statute by excision, alteration or
addition in order to carry forth the mandate of the ERA. Thus far the courts
have limited themselves to their traditional role of reshaping the common
law96 and applying their powers of excision.
IV. Property of the Marriage
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court demonstrated its awareness of the
emancipation of married women and changing social conditions when it
erased the common law presumption that ownership of household goods
was in the husband 97 and substituted therefore the presumption that
husband and wife own household goods as tenants by the entireties.
In DiFlorido v. DiFlorido98 a wife brought action in replevin and
equity against her former husband to recover household furniture and
effects and other items that the parties had accumulated prior to and during
marriage. The goods had been purchased primarily with the husband's
savings. In light of the Equal Rights Amendment and the Married Wom-
en's Property Act9 9 the justices dismissed the common law presumption.
They refused to follow precedent "that would base ownership of house-
hold items on proof of funding alone, since to so do would necessitate an
itemized accounting whenever a dispute over household goods arose and
would fail to acknowledge the equally important and often substantial
nonmonetary contributions made by either spouse." 00
The court at last recognized nonmonetary contribution of one spouse,
such contribution giving rise to ownership of a share in the household
property of the marriage. The case related only to household goods, but it is
hoped that the concept of nonmonetary contribution will find additional
recognition. The judicial role in expanding this concept may be limited.
The concept carried further calls for legislative action addressing owner-
ship and distribution of all marital property upon dissolution of a marriage.
of the excision was to permit minimum sentences for males and females. Id. See notes 124-29
and accompanying text infra. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
96. The court has extended non-statutory rights by judicial decree. In Hopkins v.
Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended the
common-law right of consortium to wives. Heretofore recovery was limited exclusively to
males. The court extended the right because "[t]o draw such a distinction would have no
rational or proper foundation at law, and would clearly be a form of invalid discrimination
based strictly on sex." Id. at 93, 320 A.2d at 140. The actions of the court demonstrate the
courts' traditional role in reshaping common law and their traditional reluctance to modify the
language of statutory enactments.
97. At common law personal property of the wife acquired prior to or after the marriage
was owned by the husband. The husband's personal property was his own. 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 405, 427-33 (2d ed. 1899); 102 U. PA. L. REV. 258
(1953).
98.. 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174 (1975).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 32.1 (Purdon 1965).
100. 459 Pa. at 650, 331 A.2d at 179.
Unlike Pennsylvania,' 0 1 many other common-law jurisdictions 0 2 em-
power divorce courts to distribute marital property upon dissolution of the
marriage in a fair and equitable manner. 103 Underlying these systems is the
partnership concept of marriage and the recognition of the monetary as well
as the nonmonetary contribution of each spouse.
In Butler v. Butler °4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered
other important issues relating to marital property and the marital relation-
ship: the presumption that a husband makes a gift to his wife when he
contributes his separate funds to the purchase of entireties property; the
presumption that a constructive trust is created in favor of the wife when
she contributes her separate funds to the purchase of entireties property;
and the presumption that a confidential relationship is imposed upon the
parties by their marital status. Carefully considering the import of the
ERA, the court extended the first presumption'0 5 and abolished the
second. '06 Furthermore, the court noted, marriage alone does not create a
confidential relationship although one may be proven by competent
evidence. 1
07
Butler appropriately used the ERA to extend or demolish presump-
tions that provided advantage to one sex at the expense of the other. Those
presumptions no longer served a rational purpose; they were based on the
outmoded model of the weak, naive, unsophisticated wife being over-
reached by her strong, knowledgeable husband. Their passage into obliv-
ion does not remove needed protection from the female. It is only fair that
the law requires each party to prove his or her contribution to specific
property in order to prove his or her share of ownership.
101. Pennsylvania is a common-law property state. In the absence of agreement upon
divorce, ownership of marital property is determined by title.
102. See Foster & Freed, Marital Property Reform in New York: Partnership of Co-
Equals?, 8 FAM. L.Q. 169, 170 (1974).
103. Section 307 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act suggests that the following
factors be considered in the disposition of property:
(1) contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property including
contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(2) value of property set apart to each spouse;
(3) duration of the marriage; and
(4) economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to
become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or
the right to live therein for a reasonable period to the spouse having custody of
the children.
9 UNIF. LAWS ANN. § 307 at 289 (Supp. 1976).
104. 464 Pa. 522, 347 A.2d 477 (1975). A divorcing husband and wife held real property
valued at $22,000 as tenants by the entireties. Approximately 27% of the purchase price came
from joint savings, approximately 73% from a joint bank account. The wife alleged that the
73% represented her separate funds which she deposited in the joint account under her
husband's undue influence. She thereby attempted to negate the consequence of a Pennsyl-
vania statute converting ownership of property held as tenants by the entireties into tenancy
in common after divorce. (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 501 (Purdon 1965)). She unsuccessfully
urged the court to impose a constructive trust on the realty, arguing that the property was
purchased with her separate funds and that the creation of the entireties property arose from
her husband's exertion of undue influence on her and the family finances.
105. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 501 (Purdon 1965).
106. -[A]ny time either a husband or wife contributes towards the purchase of entireties
property their contribution is presumed to be a gift to the other." 464 Pa. at 528, 347 A.2d at
480 (emphasis added).
107. "A constructive trust will be imposed only when it appears that the parties are in
fact in a confidential relationship with one party enjoying an advantage over the other because
of superior knowledge or influence and that this domination caused a gift to entireties
property to arise." Id. at 529, 347 A.2d at 481.
DiFlorido and Butler represent a healthy trend in the court. Those
decisions have eliminated or equalized sex based presumptions that are
facially discriminatory and have no rational or compelling basis.
V. Child Custody
Pennsylvania courts have not yet definitively decided the issue of
custody under the Equal Rights Amendment. Given two fit parents, judges
have found decisions in custody cases difficult and emotionally draining.
To guide the decision maker while at the same time serving the best
interests of the child, 10 8 the presumption favoring the mother as a custodial
parent developed. 109 This presumption is especially strong when children
are of tender years. 
110
In advance of actual adjudication it is not difficult to predict the
demise of the presumption."' Since the intent of the Equal Rights
Amendment is to afford males and females equal opportunity, the pre-
sumption, which denies such opportunity, cannot constitutionally stand.
Judges will then be placed in the difficult position of deciding which parent
would best serve the interests of the child without a presumption to guide
them. 112
108. The 'best interest of the child' is the guiding principle upon which child
custody cases are decided. Its judicial interpretation is almost limitless. Often it
masks personal bias-financial, social, religious or even, in a broad sense, political.
Whether a wife prevails over a husband, a grandparent over a father, an agency
over a foster parent, the child is often the loser.
S. KATZ. THE YOUNGEST MINORITY 1, 1 (1974). See Friedman v. Friedman, 224 Pa. Super. Ct.
530, 307 A.2d 292 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 92 (Purdon 1965).
109. See Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 450 Pa. 352, 299 A.2d 243 (1973).
110. See Davidyan v. Davidyan, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 495, 327 A.2d 139 (1974); Common-
wealth ex rel. Skurat v. Gearhart, 178 Pa. Super. Ct. 245, 115 A.2d 395 (1955) (child may be,
but is not necessarily, considered of tender years until the age of 14).
Ill. Dictum in a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case supports the demise of the
tender years presumption.
We also question the legitimacy of a doctrine [the tender years presumption]
that is predicated upon traditional or stereotypic roles of men and women in a
marital union . . . . [The tender years doctrine] is offensive to the concept of the
equality of the sexes which we have embraced as a constitutional principle within
this jurisdiction.
Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, - Pa. -, -, § 68 A.2d 635, 639-40 (1977).
In addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has shown its determination to equalize
rights of mothers and fathers in adoption proceedings. In Adoption of Walker, - Pa. -, 360
A.2d 603 (1976), the court excised the following sentence of the Adoption Act as violative of
the ERA: "In the case of an illegitimate child the consent [to adoption] of the mother only
shall be necessary." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 411(3) (Purdon Supp. 1976). The court reasoned
that "the distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers is patently invalid under the
Pennsylvania Constitution." - Pa. at -, 360 A.2d at 605.
112. The difficulty in determining the best interests of the child is shown by the
conflicting theories and studies by experts. At least one author supports the view that a young
child should remain with its mother, but that after a specified age, and based on the
circumstances, a boy should be with his father and a girl with her mother. See Bradbrook, The
Relevance of Psychological and Psychiatric Studies to the Future Development of the Laws
Governing the Settlement of Inter-Parental Child Custody Disputes, 11 J. FAM. L. 557 (1971).
Others emphasize the need for permanence and the potential injury to a child's welfare if he or
she is shifted from parent to parent. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYONDTHF
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973); A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 197 (1968).
Section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act attempts to list factors to be
considered by courts awarding custody:
(1) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interests;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
Some commentators have forecasted that the eradication of the
presumption will cause minimal societal change. "Given present social
realities and subconscious values of judges, mothers would undoubtedly
continue to be awarded custody in the preponderance of situations, but the
black letter law would no longer weight the balance in this direction." 113
VI. Interscholastic Athletics
The only sex discrimination case to come before the supreme court in
which the suspect classification analysis under the ERA may have been
appropriate was Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic
Association " 4 (PIAA). The Commonwealth brought an action against the
PIAA, an unincorporated association of public junior and senior high
schools and private schools which regulates interscholastic competition
among its members. The Commonwealth's complaint challenged the
constitutionality of article XIX, section 3B of the PIAA bylaws: "Girls
shall not compete or practice against boys in any athletic contest." 115
The commonwealth court declared the bylaw unconstitutional on its
face as violative of the Equal Rights Amendment, citing Conway v.
Dana,"6 Hopkins v. Blanco,117 Henderson v. Henderson18 and Com-
monwealth v. Butler. 1"9 Following precedent the court took the absolutist
view that gender-based classification is not permissible. The court's
decision even exceeded the prayer for relief. Plaintiff excluded practice
and participation by females in the contact sports of football and wrestling
from their request for injunctive relief. The court found "no valid reason
for excepting those two sports"' 120 and proceeded to issue a broad order.
A dissenter asked the crucial question "whether the constitutional
provision in question is absolute." 121 In other words, does the Equal
Rights Amendment mandate the eradication of all sex-based classifica-
tions? It is urged that the answer to the query is "No." In acts and
regulations pertaining to sports, it may be appropriate to classify on the
basis of sex, provided such classification has compelling reason and does
not eliminate, either directly or indirectly, participation of both sexes in the
specified athletic activity.
In interscholastic athletics, certain classifications may be desirable
and reasonable. In recognition of differences in height, weight, strength
and other physical attributes, gender segregated teams may be permissible
for contact sports, 122 but the proponent of the.classification should bear the
affirmative burden of justifying the segregation.
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
9 UNIF. LAWS ANN. § 402, at 504 (1973).
113. Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, supra note 68, at 953.
114. 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975).
115. Id. at 48, 334 A.2d at 840.
116. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
117. 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974).
118. 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974).
119. 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974).
120. 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 53, 334 A.2d at 843 (1975).
121. Id. at 54, 334 A.2d at 843.
122. Brenden v. Independent School District, 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd,
Such classification based on sex should automatically be subject to
strict scrutiny under the suspect classification test. In the PIAA case the
court should have applied the suspect classification analysis and concluded
that a bylaw permitting segregated teams in contact sports, if sufficiently
narrow, might be constitutional.' 23
VII. Criminal Law
The impact of the ERA has not been felt in the civil law alone. In the
area of criminal law, the Equal Rights Amendment offers the legislature
and judiciary a clear mandate to end sex discrimination. The judicial
response has been decisive. Commonwealth v. Butler 124 challenged
Pennsylvania's statutory sentencing plan for criminal offenders under
which males but not females received minimum sentences. 125 The exist-
ence of a statutory minimum sentence significantly relates to an offender's
eligibility for parole. 126 The male is eligible for parole upon expiration of
his minimum sentence. The female, who cannot receive a minimum
sentence, is technically eligible for parole the moment she is incarcerated.
In practice, however, the Board of Probation and Parole will not
consider the case of a female offender until the expiration of an
arbitrary period which, in some cases, may be longer than the
minimum sentence which would have been imposed on a male
offender in the same circumstances. Thus, while in most cases
the burden of discrimination will fall on male prisoners, in some
cases it will be the female prisoner who will be penalized by the
bipartite statutory scheme.
127
The court noted that the inequity in the sentencing scheme violated the
ERA. To cure the defect the court excised one sentence of the statute,
477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
Some writers give pause at the thought of "unisex" teams:
It is sometimes said that a rigid requirement of equality is no less proper for the
sexes than for the races, and no less workable. But the moral dimensions of the
concept of equality are clearly not the same in the two cases. To hold separate
Olympic competitions for whites and blacks would be deeply repugnant to our
sensibilities. Do we-should we-feel the same repugnance, that same sense of
degradation, at the separate competitions for men and women?
Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 234,240
(1971).
Others argue against all segregated teams:
[Slex-neutral rules can be promulgated to enable members of both sexes to compete
against each other on an equal basis. . . . Rules based on such factors as height,
weight and the ratio of height to weight would enable schools to group individuals
according to athletic potential, regardless of sex, thus ensuring equitable competi-
tion. Individuals of either sex who deviated from the average for their sex in a
particular characteristic would not be penalized for the deviation by being denied
athletic opportunities, or being forced to compete with individuals of substantially
greater athletic potential, merely because of sex.
Brown & Freedman, Sex Averaging and the Equal Rights Amendment (unpublished) (avail-
able from Women's Law Project, 112 S. 16th St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19102).
123. There are some basic difficulties with the 'unisex' approach, not the least of
which is that there are physiological and biological differences betwen men and
women that are not subject to eradication even by constitutional amendment.
Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment: Some Problems of Construction, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 243, 247 (1971).
124. 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974).
125. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1051-57 (Purdon 1964); id. tit. 61, §§ 551-91.
126. See id. tit. 61, §§ 331.1 to 331.34 (Purdon Supp. 1976).
127. Commonwealth v. Butler. 458 Pa. 289. 304-05. 328 A.2d 851. 860 (1974).
thereby removing the prohibition against minimum sentences for
females.' 28 Men and women are now in parity, and a minimum sentence
may be imposed on males and females alike.
The need for restructuring the sentencing scheme so as to provide
identical treatment in minimum sentencing for males and females was
clearly indicated. Although the primary foundation of the decision was the
Equal Rights Amendment, the court buttressed its conclusion with an equal
protection analysis, noting that there was no rational basis for the distinc-




The Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment commands equality of
right between the sexes and provides the legal underpinning for achieving
this goal. The courts, limited to the issues properly before them, have
created an uneven patchwork result in implementing the Equal Rights
Amendment. The social fabric, which is in need of comprehensive
alteration by the legislature, has been spottily mended by the courts. On
balance the consequence of this mending process may have adversely
affected women by weakening the family and by making the homemaker
and custodial parent vulnerable.
For the most part, the courts have adopted the absolutist position
making sex an impermissible factor in determining legal rights. This view
holds that the law must be sex neutral. Such a limited outlook shows no
recognition or sensitivity to the vast majority of adult women, the transi-
tional women. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Conway v. Dana130
dispossessed transitional women. The sweeping language of the case made
child support an equal obligation of both parents, but was silent on the
question of whether a dollar value shall be attributed to the custodial
parent's nonmonetary contribution. Since the court used the absolutist
rationale commanding equality of the child support burden, essential
fairness required that the court give the custodial parent economic credit for
the services he or she performs.
To some lower courts the Conway v. Dana decision established the
legal and doctrinal framework for interpreting the Equal Rights Amend-
ment in absolutist terms. While the supreme court did use the absolutist
approach, its decision need not be interpreted as mandating this rationale to
the exclusion of all others. The Conway v. Dana decision did not addre ss
itself to the statutory support laws, but only to prior decisional law.
128. The court excised the following sentence: "The court in imposing sentence shall not
fix a minimum sentence, but shall fix such maximum sentence as the court shall deem
appropriate .... ." See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 566 (Purdon Supp. 1974).
129. Prior to the enactment of the Equal Rights Amendment in Pennsylvania, the
supreme court struck down a maximum sentencing scheme, which was openly discriminatory
to one sex, using an equal protection analysis. See Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642,243
A.2d 400 (1968).
130. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974). See notes 40-54 and accompanying text supra.
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The court has reviewed the statutory support design in a series of
interspousal support cases and has found equal treatment of the sexes, but
this strained interpretation is at best inaccurate. Pennsylvania support laws
whether dealing with child or interspousal support have no perceptible
design, plan or organization. They are complex, confusing, and redundant.
They intertwine substantive, procedural, criminal and civil laws. It is vital
that the legislature draw a new comprehensive blueprint for support,
incorporating the concept of the Equal Rights Amendment and the concept
of marriage as a partnership and acknowledging the nonmonetary contribu-
tion of the homemaker and custodial parent.
The DiFlorido case' 3 ' stands as the star of all of the Pennsylvania
ERA cases for its adoption of the simple proposition that household goods
are not presumed to be the property of the husband. In so doing, the court
acknowledged the wife's nonmonetary contribution to the household as a
legal factor. Underlying the holding is the partnership concept of marriage.
This concept, recognized for the first time by a Pennsylvania court, should
be adopted by the legislature and expanded by the courts.
Until now, the basic approach of the courts has been narrow; they
have adopted the absolutist approach to the Equal Rights Amendment. The
only case to come before the courts in which the suspect classification
analysis may have been appropriate was Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania
Interscholastic Athletic Association.132 The court, by forbidding sex
classification even as to contact sports, may have denied females places on
certain contact sport teams. For example, if a school can fund only two
basketball teams it is probable that all members, based on physiological
realities, will be males. If gender classification is permitted, within this
narrow scope, and female as well as male squads mandated, then women
would be guaranteed the opportunity to participate.
The courts must broaden their cognitive base in deciding ERA cases
and must seek alternatives to their absolutist position when appropriate.
The legislature must review and revamp all statutes dealing directly or
indirectly with sex bias. Both the legislature and the judiciary in undertak-
ing their task must recognize the present condition as well as the changing
position of the female and male in society.
131. See notes 97-100 and accompanying text supra.
132. 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975). See notes 114-123 and accompanying
text supra.
